Policy networks in cross-border metropolitan regions
The liberalisation of intra-European borders has left a lasting imprint on cross-border metropolitan regions. Some border cities have been able to exploit the recent permeability of state borders. They utilise economic benefits arising from the diverging potentials of a confluent Europe characterised by free movements of people, goods, capital, and services. Long considered a handicap for economic development, previously separating borders have now become resources (Sohn, 2013) for metropolitan development, an opportunity and valuable asset in the worldwide competition between cities and regions. From an institutional perspective, the integration process promoted by the European Union (EU) has helped to encourage new power configurations, replacing unilateral border dependency and giving rise to policy networks designed to cope with the unevenness of cross-border metropolitan development. As van Houtum and van Naerssen argue, "it is at borders where normative values of differential social systems meet. Borders function as spatial mediators of often latent power and governance discourses and practices of places in society ... and ineluctably represent the governing and preserving of values " (2002: 129) . In other words: A major challenge actors in policy networks face is the difference in policy cultures on either side of a border. Policy cultures serve as organising concepts for regional policies and planning (Young, 2008) and are determined by "particularities of history, attitudes, beliefs and values, cognitive frames, interpretations of ... tasks and responsibilities, political and legal traditions, rules and norms, different levels of market integration, and different institutional structures of governance" (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009: 39) .
In this paper, we therefore discuss aspects of policy spaces in the bordering process and shift our analytical focus towards the actors of two different policy networks. We focus on transportation policy networks, a key sector when it comes to reinforcing the physical integration between national territories and, as a matter subjected to national strategic decision-making, a highly contested field in cross-border cooperation. We analyse possible national preferences of actors integrated in transboundary policy networks that are designed to overcome 'borders' in a respective policy realm in border regions. 3 Network actors originate from the different regions and countries that have been forming and transforming inner-European border regions (Fürst, 2009) . Their distinct cultural contexts may likely be influencing the spatial reach of specific policy activities and decisions in cross-border policy networks, or in 'policy spaces of action'. If actors greatly differ in their perception of the relevant policy space, this would imply consequences for the network's capacity to act and the way political actions are in fact obeyed. An over-reaching of specific areas within a border region by certain actors may impede decision-making and manifest traditional nationalist views.
Therefore, we aim at answering: Do policy actors overvalue their represented territorial parts of the policy space? If so, who does, who does not, to what degree, and why? We assume that policy actors with a certain policy culture socialisation (possibly best represented in terms of their nationality) may overvalue those parts of the policy space that belong to their own country due to their familiarity with a particular policy culture. A positive answer to this question may lead to an actual mismatch between a policy network's juridical territory and its perceived policy action space. 2 Although the majority of policy actors has in-depth knowledge regarding differing aspects of the policy field of public transport in their respective border region, we reason that the perception of what constitutes the relevant policy space is still strongly influenced by the actors' cultural roots, traditional national discourses, cognitive frames and/or shared heuristic devices. They in turn manifest themselves in distinct nationally informed policy solutions. An empirical evaluation of the actors' network positions in combination with a careful analysis of their individual attributes would thus, as we propose, illuminate the perceived inclusion/exclusion of spaces of policy action in border situations. We hence shift our analytical focus from a prevailing structural approach of policy networks (for an overview of the history of policy network analysis, see e.g. Knoke, 2012; Rhodes, 2008) towards aspects of a more actororiented research perspective (Brunet-Jailly, 2013; Dörry, 2014) , thus applying a mixed methods-approach of in-depth interviews, mental mapping, and social network analysis (SNA). We develop our arguments on the examples of transport policies in the border regions of Basel and Luxembourg, and, on a more general level, aim at contributing to a "polymorphy of sociospatial relations" in contemporary sociospatial theory (Jessop et al., 2008: 392) . 4 In the next section, we formulate explanatory foundations for our analysis. The third section discusses the policy field of cross-border public transportation and links it with the respective backgrounds of the two case studies, Basel and Luxembourg. In the fourth section, we outline the methods combined in this paper. Subsequently, we examine to what extent the allegedly relevant policy space for cross-border public transport depends on the attributes of the actors and their structural position in policy networks. We conclude by wrapping-up our key points, discussing possible research avenues towards a more comprehensive understanding of policy networks in border regions, and arguing that such policy spaces are always relational.
Relational policy spaces
Borders articulate a regional political dilemma due to a fundamental question of (economic) power. Some bordering regions bolster the economic dynamics of the 'other side' whilst feeling at a disadvantage as underpaid suppliers. Unfolding conflicts about resources and dependency, identity, and 'othering ' (van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002) are among the challenges that cross-border policy cooperation schemes face. The recently introduced concepts of territorial cohesion and cooperation between EU metropolitan border-regions have (re)enforced modes of functional multi-level governance (type-II-governance, cf. Marks, 1993; Marks and Hooghe, 2004 ) via policy networks. Cooperation in such policy networks builds on a number of politico-economic interdependencies; it supports the valorisation of the border's resources but is not legally enforceable. Previous studies on cross-border policy networks suggest, however, that competing policy solutions and organising concepts still prevail (Dörry and Decoville, 2013) , which in general supports the manifestation of dissonant spatial perceptions among actors on either side of a border.
There have been two influential strands on border studies in the past. Scholars approaching borders and border regions through constructivist perspectives (e.g. Newman and Paasi, 1998; Paasi, 1999; van Houtum and Strüver, 2002; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002) have underlined the different kinds of meaning of borders and border regions, de/constructing the altering social and political border perceptions and cognitions (van Houtum, 2000) as well as the border's relevance as important identity markers (Eskelinen et al., 1999; Liikanen, 1999; Paasi, 1996) . With his concept of mental distance, van Houtum (1999) argues that "belief sets", conventions, 5 and socially constructed rationalities shape individuals' own subjective borders and own behavioural patterns. Paasi (1996) similarly considers borders to be "spatial institutions", influenced by people's identities that shape the meaning of the border on their thoughts and behaviours. In that sense, border space represents "a process of social production and reproduction of mental representations, leading to the creation and prolonging of the images of 'us' versus 'them'" (van Houtum, 2000: 71) .
Scholars engaged in analysing border regions from the conceptual angle of the new regionalism mainly utilise similar constructivist approaches of discourses but still struggle to define what remains a rather "opaque" concept of 'regional identity' (cf. Paasi, 2013) . Administrative state organisations are determining actors for normative-political regionalisation. Activities of structuring and coordinating politicoadministrative operations contribute to region building, in which the process of regionalisation is utilised as a medium to exercise power. This notion, however, builds on the principle of territory, in which powers and spheres of competence of administrative and political organisations refer to clearly defined spaces (Weichhart, 2008) . It reminds us of the long traditions of territorially shaped planning cultures, whose differences are certainly more evident in border regions. For a more nuanced understanding of space, the recognition of the contextuality of social action becomes significant (Thrift, 1985) . Regions are socially constructed because they are "constituted and reconstituted as the contingent outcome of interaction between diverse (often competing) economic, political and social forces operating both proximate to, and at a distance from, a particular locality" (Harrison, 2012: 59) . In other words, regions can be defined as situated contexts of individual (formal and informal) actions, choices, traditions, practices, and discourses (cf. Giddens, 1986 Giddens, [1984 ; Ramutsindela, 2011; Werlen, 1997) . A 'border' adds further social sets of practices to the conceptualisation of a region, often still facing national particularism and territorial anxieties (Scott and van Houtum, 2009) . Such spaces are, however, "not 'givens' but are created -for human agency designates human beings as makers of their milieu, albeit within unequal power relations" (Dyck and Kearns, 2006: 88; O'Dowd, 2010) .
In this paper, we aim to overcome the concept of territorially articulated politics and scalar logic and instead refer to a socio-relational space with no predefined territorial boundaries (Allen and Cochrane, 2007) . We develop our argument on the example of two cross-border policy networks. On a strategic level, policy networks 6 largely comprise state or municipal actors, whereas the operative level mainly incorporates representatives of the private economy and the civil society (Rhodes, 2008) .
In general, actors' relations in networks are shaped by their "constant feedback between structure and behaviour" (Kadushin, 2012: 11) . This is an important notion as empirical observations with regard to cross-border policy networks suggest "that decision-making processes are still fragmented and deeply anchored in traditional national decision-making structures and rationales" (Dörry and Decoville, 2013: 2) .
Both, Paasi's (1986) account of a region as product of collective socio-spatial action and Giddens' notion of structuration (1981) , 'sensitise' not only for a careful analysis of non-/mobile social practices and discourses in cross-border policy networks butas we argue in this paper -also of the differences between policy spaces by actors in policy networks that are produced, reproduced, and transcended by "power relations that are mobilized for various purposes" (Paasi, 2012 (Paasi, : 2304 .
Both major conceptual approaches, however, often seem to examine border policies without placing them in a wider context, i.e., although their work relates to thick, illustrative descriptions, it seems that the actual explanation is rather thin. Such limitations are fittingly illustrated by the fact that the link between those approaches analysing and exploring individual attitudes, perceptions, and behaviours and those approaches that focus on their socio-spatial effects as well as on "the political and social functions of bordering practices" (Paasi, 2012 (Paasi, : 2307 is not yet well established.
More recent border study approaches have thus incorporated this criticism and shifted the analytical focus from a macro towards a more micro level (Brunet-Jailly, 2013), thus providing an adequate analytical level to study socio-dynamics of policy spaces.
Although cross-border policy spaces are formally predefined by the politically mandated territories, informally, policy actors negotiate and contest what they perceive as being an appropriate policy space for a policy field in border situations. In turn, this may enable them to include or exclude specific areas and projects. Policy spaces are thus, as we argue in this paper, highly relational and dynamic.
Transport policy networks in Basel and Luxembourg
Favourable economic conditions found in the Swiss and Luxembourg parts in their respective cross-border metropolitan regions (CBMRs) (map 1) attract a large number of daily commuters. In the Basel region, 11,800 daily commuters use public transport 7 from the adjacent countries (TEB 2012), while an approximate number of 18, 200 travel to the agglomeration of Luxembourg-City (Schmitz and Gerber, 2012) . Vigorous transboundary labour markets are polarized by the bio-pharmaceutical cluster in Basel City and the financial industry in Luxembourg City. Against this background, cross-border public transport policies need to efficiently coordinate the manifold daily cross-border movements and interactions, e.g. by improving accessibility via expansions of the rail and road infrastructure, harmonisation of tariff systems, coordination of conflicting time tables, or information of customers across national borders.
Map 1: The Basel and Luxembourg cross-border regions

Source and cartography: authors
The two case studies represent important European transportation hubs in which two overlapping levels of infrastructure and, thus, the respective policy network actors meet: the (inter-)regional level and the macro-regional level. The former is primarily relevant for the two case studies, whereas we only mention the latter being the frame for the large European railway corridors. Potential French-German linguistic differentials within the two regions diminish due to the Luxembourg and Swiss multi-lingual 9 bridges (Walther and Reitel, 2013) , whereas the nation state's sovereignty in both regions via national laws and regulations incisively conditions politico-economic features.
The implementation of cross-border transport policies highlights a number of contradictory interests that make studying the policy networks particularly interesting. First, cross-border transport projects are usually costly and cannot be developed and implemented without a minimal level of political and economic cross-border cooperation. Second, cross-border transport policies are subject to national interests such as: Which infrastructure should be funded? Where should rail or road routes go?
And which of the neighbouring partners should finance it? The EU's policies reinforce a Janus-faced situation within border-regions, by simultaneously encouraging regions to engage in regional cooperation and competition. Both Basel and Luxembourg face such a contradictory situation.
The Basel Region
The Basel region is characterised by a strong historical dominance of Basel City as an economic and cultural centre. Long known for its chemical cluster, Basel has developed highly innovative sectors in the field of pharmaceutical, medical, and lifesciences since the mid-1990s. Basel City is also recognised as a major cultural centre and still remains among the richest Swiss cantons with a deliberate international orientation. Basel urban elites have developed a common vision of what the city's place in the world, thus creating a strong contrast to the neighbouring French and German municipalities. At the same time, the regions' policy actors regard themselves as pioneers in cross-border cooperation, sharing a vision of a common future and building on several cross-border structures developed since the 1960s. They comprise the Trinational Eurodistrict of Basel and metrobasel, mostly active at the local level, the Regio Basiliensis and the Regio TriRhena, whose focus is more regional, and the Upper Rhine Conference and Council, which target the macro-regional level (Reitel, 2006) . More recently, Basel benefitted from the Swiss Confederation Agglomeration Policy that finances large-scale transport infrastructure in the CBMR provided the project serves the interests of the Basel region as a whole. Partly financed with Swiss funds (Swiss Federal Council, 2010) , a tramline now connects Basel City with Germany and an extension to France is planned for 2016 (Walther and Reitel, 2013 Deriving from the repeated territorial movements and changing border demarcations in the area of today's 'Greater Region' in the past, this particular border region is the product of a decisive political will to cooperate in a larger regional space (Niedermeyer and Moll, 2007) . In addition to the 1971 established working committee Regional Commission Saarland-Lothringen-Luxemburg-Trier/Westpfalz, a platform for the highest representatives -the Heads of (federal) states or governments -of the region, the Summit of the Greater Region, was founded in 1995. The organisation of cross-border cooperation, however, differs greatly between each member region and the legislative and regulatory systems are not always compatible with each other (Chilla et al., 2010) . A number of consultative public bodies complement the summit's work and comprise about 20 working groups to steer specific thematic priorities, among other cross-border public transportation. The arguable large size of the cooperation space Greater Region goes far beyond the core region close to the borders of the original SaarLorLux area. It is constantly subject to contention but is based on the summit's mandated territory that encloses the entire political territories of the neighbouring regions. Hence, this "pooled territory" is still missing "a crossborder perimeter" (Chilla et al., 2012: 970) , as all policy fields in the Greater Region are still subject to the respective national jurisdictions.
Methods
Which actor in which position within the policy network perceives which kind of policy space to be relevant for respective policy measures? To analyse this, we apply a mixed-methods approach that combines qualitative interviews, cognitive maps, and SNA.
The survey among policy actors in cross-border transportation in the Luxembourg region included interviews with 41 representatives from 34 public and private organisations in Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg. In the Basel region, the survey comprised 44 actors from 29 public and private organisations located in France, Germany and Switzerland. These interviews first served the purpose to collect cognitive maps and to reveal the actors' cognitive perception of their network's relevant policy space of action. To each interviewee we presented a topographical 11 map of the respective border region with the major physical infrastructure and cities and asked them to draw the limits of what they perceived to be the relevant space of policy action for cross-border transport policies.
3 The resulting total of 70 mental maps, 34 in Basel and 36 in Luxembourg (15 interviewees did not perform the task of mapping), provided a global picture of the two border regions as perceived by our respondents. Their comparison as well as the application of several measures of surface and dispersion, such as the average distance to the centre of gravity, standard distance and standard deviational ellipse, indicates the actors' meaning of the policy spaces.
Our methodological approach shares similarities with the one applied by BrennanHorley and Gibson (2009), who used cognitive maps to investigate patterns of concentration and 'epicentres' of creativity in Darwin, Australia.
Since Kevin Lynch's (1960) pioneering study on Los Angeles, Boston, and Jersey City, cognitive maps have been widely used to study environmental cognition (Heft, 2013; Kitchin, 1994) . follow the discussed 'social fabrics' of policy networks, because a social system can cause conformance pressure among its members regarding the possible aims of actions and the permissible means used for reaching the aim (Weichhart, 2008: 263-4) .
We hence expect that our empirical results reflect a tendency for similarities of the spatial representation among actors of the same nationality.
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The second purpose of our interviews was to reveal the structural position of each actor within their policy network. Using snowball techniques that allow to identify actors among our interviewees, we asked our respondents with whom they had been exchanging information regarding cross-border public transport in 2009/2010.
They were free in their nomination of persons and their respective location or nationality. This network is called an information network, since it primarily concerns the exchange of information between policy makers (for a more detailed description, see Walther and Reitel, 2013) .
The network was then mapped with the UCINET software NetDraw (Borgatti et al., 2002) and tested for several measures of centrality (Freeman, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . The most basic is degree centrality, which measures the number of ties between an actor and the rest of the network. Degree centrality is a local measure that is often associated with power, since actors with many social ties can exert control and disseminate orders and key information to more peripheral ones. We further In general, there is only a loose correspondence between the policy spaces drawn by the policy actors and the existing geographical extension of the crossborder functional areas, defined as an integrated labour market where cross-border commuting is predominant (Sohn et al., 2009) Policy actors do not only express divergent views on the general size of the border region. They also have different opinions on how the cross-border region is subdivided between the various countries. In the Basel region, each nationality tends to overestimate the part of the region located in its own country (table 2). The Swiss assess the relevant policy space located in their own country to be of a respective larger proportion (2,016.9 km 2 ), compared with those located in Germany (1,993.1 km 2 ) and in France (1,182.6 km 2 ). The French and the German actors also tend to overestimate their sub-regions compared to foreign border territories. (table 3) . One should, however, note that the Luxembourg national territory is much smaller than the bordering territories in the neighbouring countries. In fact, the average value given by the Luxembourg respondents (2,031 km 2 ) is close to the actual size of the country Luxembourg (2,586 km 2 ), suggesting that the entire national territory is perceived as being relevant for cross-border transport policies. Second, the perimeters drawn by the actors include a number of cities, whose size, political importance, and economic activities considerably differ from each other. Table 4 problems on a daily basis. In Basel, the core area comprises the cities of Basel, Saint-Louis, and Lörrach, and corresponds roughly with the Trinational Eurodistrict of Basel, whose perimeter is based on the urban area defined by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. It is within this area that most of the political and financial efforts for improving transport policies have been developed. It also illustrates the current refocusing of cross-border cooperation at the scale of the urban area (Walther and Reitel, 2013) . The focus on the core urban area is obvious on some of the cognitive maps drawn in the Basel region by Swiss, German, and French actors. They distinguish between the urban agglom-19 erations, where tramways are important, and the larger functional area, from which most cross-border workers commute and where inter-city trains operate more frequently.
In Luxembourg, the core area is larger than the Luxembourg metropolitan area as defined by Sohn and Walther (2008) . considering that in 1985 the Schengen Agreement, which led to the abolition of border checks, was signed a few kilometres away across the Moselle River. In the case of Basel, the centre of gravity of all maps is located in the German municipality of Lör-rach (table 5) , less than 10 km from Basel City. 
20
To back up our results, we also utilised two measures of compactness to evaluate the clustering of our distribution: the standard distance and the standard deviational ellipse (table 5) 
Network centrality and spatial perception: two contrasting cases
The sociograms in figures 1 and 2 show how social relations between the policy actors who drew the mental maps shape the policy networks (for details on the two policy networks, see Dörry and Decoville, 2013; Walther and Reitel, 2013) . The colour of the nodes reflects the nationality with Swiss actors in red, German actors in yellow, French actors in blue, Luxembourg actors in white, and Belgian actors in orange.
The spatial distance between the social actors is proportional to their social proximity when it comes to the exchange of information: The more ties they have, the closer they are. The size of the node is proportional to an actor's degree centrality. Central actors are, thus, prominent in the sense that they have a large number of social ties as potential sources of influence or constraint.
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Figure 1: Basel policy network with countries in colour (degree centrality)
Source: authors; Software: UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) . Note: Isolates are not shown. (table 6) , where the correlations are weak and/or slightly positive. (Carley, 2012) . Note: N=30 in Basel, N=30 in Luxembourg These contradictory results may be explained by the differences in the policy culture of the two border regions. In Basel, in the absence of legally binding agreements, the success of cross-border cooperation relies heavily on the ability to bring together actors with conflicting agendas around policy issues. Prominent policy net- "... especially in France, the national interest is very dominant; we often realise projects that do not directly benefit the Saarland, but within a transnational cooperation you do not withdraw. In France, a tough policy of national interest is being pursued, also in regard to transnational transport" (LU_DE_06_01).
Summary and interpretation of the empirical results
European border regions have been transforming towards integration and liberalisation, thus, requiring efficient cross-border governance regimes to exploit the potential resources of formerly separated regions. Cross-border policy networks are manifestations of such governance regimes. Our empirical analysis started from the premise that the 'making' of such new policy spaces requires the consideration of culturally anchored cognitive boundaries of the policy actors involved. Thus, in a first step, we looked at the persistence of individual national preferences in the spatial representation of the policy actors engaged in cross-border transport policies. We linked network data of policy actors in the border regions of Basel and Luxembourg with their individual perceptions towards the policy space covered by the conceptual governance construct of a 'policy network'. This was based on the argument that cultural diversity and the respective institutional settings have a spatial component, i.e., serve as organising concepts (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009 ).
We found dominating national preferences by the actors' spatial representations of the policy network in the Luxembourg region. In the Basel region, however, a consensus on the limits of the border region seems to have emerged, which is consistent with the EU set-up of governance actions towards an 'inclusive' development in border regions. Our results further show that the attributes of the individual policy actors cannot explain the cognitive preferences among them. Building on SNA, we have il-25 lustrated that central network actors tend to have the most consensual spatial representation of the cross-border policy space, while being able to act 'inclusively'. On the contrary, peripheral actors tend to produce dissonant cognitive maps, overestimating their own territories in relation to the aspired broad policy agreements in border contexts. Generally, we found that the degree of accuracy of the cognitive maps decreases when actors represent 'foreign' spaces, i.e., spaces outside their own (sub)national territory. The boundaries of the perceived space of action are generally well known in the actors' own national territories but become increasingly fuzzy when interviewees describe more distant areas of their border region (on the discontinuing geographies determined by distance, cf. Baybeck and Huckfeldt, 2002) . This is particularly the case with Belgian and German policy actors in the Luxembourg case, who have little direct interaction despite sharing a common border.
In the Basel region, decades of cross-border cooperation have not overcome conflicting interests (Walther and Reitel, 2013 Individual perceptions of policy spaces may bring -in the worst case -opposing border effects to the fore, thus impeding the idea of cooperation to the detriment of intra-regional competition. One conclusion might be that cross-border policy spaces must not be too sizeable, as the example of the Luxembourg case illuminates.
To even out the competing interests of the various actors, the region of Basel -having been in a similar 'space' situation like Luxembourg -decided in 2007 to downsize the actual policy space under the new label Trinational Eurodistrict of Basel.
In summary, we developed a novel perspective in order to highlight attributive network aspects of the individual policy actors in border regions, because a solely descriptive notion ignores the crucial social dimension of policy actors embedded in their disparate policy cultures, as we have argued in the beginning of the paper. Further, the contradicting core-periphery interests as well as opposing organisational structures of the transport policies and huge economic disparities shape fundamental conditions within which we need to interpret our empirical results.
Discussion
What are the repercussions of our analysis for the border regions' policy networks?
Most fundamental, we hope to have stimulated the awareness of the policy network actors' spatial incongruence's and mismatches in border situations. Transport policy spaces tend to be dynamic and manifest themselves around areas with specific problem pressure, as the empirical results in map 3 suggest. We argue that policy spaces are relational. This relationality, however, is evident in terms of two aspects: First, due to the influential architecture of the policy network, in which certain actors are more prominent and powerful in influencing decision-making than others (cf. Dörry and Decoville, 2013) . Second, a number of different interpretations of the policy space collide among the actors in a policy network. This is, therefore, subject to continuing contestation and negotiation among the network actors that shape not only project decisions but also the vision among actors of one policy network. Aided by the results of our descriptive statistics in this paper, we are able to verify both, the relationality of policy spaces as well as a sensitisation that policy actors tend to overestimate and advantage their own territories in governance settings of border regions.
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In a subsequent attempt, we have proposed a methodology to measure spatial perception in policy networks, thus enriching the policy network research with geographical parameters. This was done by comparing two case studies, which strengthens not only the theorisation of our empirical findings in terms of observing important commonalities and differences but also the drawing of policy conclusions. Our two case studies' differing results tellingly remind us to be careful of generalisations of policy strategies within the frame of such manifold and heterogeneous border regions within Europe. European border regions are too diverse to nurture generalities and contexts matter tremendously, as the comparison of the two cases Basel and Luxembourg has illustrated. To combine the analysis of de-/bordering processes with governance analyses would, in our opinion, be a fruitful research avenue. However, not only featuring a somewhat positivist approach but also by enriching the analysis and underlying the research designs with 'why'-questions, interviews with policy actors, and more qualitative research in this vein. These efforts will be worthwhile to illuminate reasons and processes of cultural, linguistic, and institutional enclosures of actors shaping the same policy network with their cognitive perceptions and behaviours.
